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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
s·rATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent,: 
-v-
CALVIN GEORGE SMITH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 190 89 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with aggravated robbery, a first-
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-202, 76-3-
203(1), 76-6-302 (1978); and with theft, a second-degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-202, 76-3-203(2), 76-6-404 
11978); for his role in the armed robbery of Mr. Alma G. Winn. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LC&J'ER COURT 
Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery and theft 
following a jury trial in the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Utah, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin presiding. He was 
sentenced on March 4, 1983, to two concurrent terms of one to 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison--to be served 
consecutively with a one-year term for using a firearm in the 
'Ommission of the crimes. On March 8, 1983, appellant moved for 
·' new trial. That motion was subsequently denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the verdict and j udgmec.t 
of the 1 ow er court, and of its denial of appellant's motion for a 
new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Alma Winn and his wife had been visited by various 
members of their family on New Year's Day, 1981 (Tl. 4). About 
8:30 p.m., Mr. Winn took a relative home, returning to his own 
residence some twenty minutes later (Tl. 4-5). It was dark 
outside (Tl. 10-11) • 
He pulled into his unlighted garage, and as he got out 
of his car and proceeded toward the door to his home, he was 
confronted by two men (Tl. 5-6, 14-16). Al though visibility in 
the garage was poor, Mr. Winn could see that the men were armed 
and masked (Tl. 6, 10-13). Mr. Winn, a retired military officer, 
was somewhat familiar with weapons (Tl. 11), and it was his 
opinion that the men were carrying dark-colored .38 caliber 
revolvers (Tl. 6, 11-12, 14, 17). Because the men were wearing 
gloves and had black nylon stockings pulled down over their 
and necks, Mr. Winn could not determine their race or national 
origin (Tl. 6, 11, 16). 
The men pointed their guns at him, grabbed him, pullec 
him to the ground, jabbed him with their guns, and pushed him 
against the door to his home as he "struggled" with them (Tl· 6 
7, 12, 14, 17-18). Mrs. Winn, over-heard the commotion, and care 
to the door to see what was going on; but because Mr. Winn was 
lying against the door, his wife was unable to open it more th 1 
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a few inches (Tl· 6-7). One of the men told the other to "[glet 
1, 1 , wallet and let's get the hell out of here" (Tl. 7-8, 18) • 
. either one grabbed the wallet from Mr. Winn's back pocket and 
then the two assailants fled (Tl. 7-8, 12). 
Mr. Winn followed his assailants out of the garage (Tl. 
121. There was sufficient light from the nearby streetlights to 
him to see them run out to the road in front of his 
residence, turn west and run toward Redwood Road (which is about 
a quarter of a mile from the Winn residence), and cross the 
Jordan River bridge (Tl. 8-11). Mr. Winn returned to the house 
and phoned the police (Tl. 8-9, 12). 
The police subsequently found nothing in the garage to 
establish the identities of the two assailants (Tl. 9). 
Mr. Winn's wallet had contained identification and 
credit cards, $75 or $80 in cash, and an unendorsed $10,000 
C.S.B. cashier's check made out to the Federal Reserve System 
ITl. 10, 14-15). 
Jay Sanchez was subsequently arrested during the summer 
of 1981 for his involvement in a South Jordan robbery with his 
cousin, Dickie Carrillo (Tl. 75-76). He was on parole at the 
'ime of the arrest (Tl. 76). After the arrest, the prosecutor 
•,ffered to grant Sanchez transactional immunity for a number of 
rimes listed in the "grant of immunity" document, provided that 
·:· testify "fully and truthfully" regarding his and any other's 
'"' l1cipation in the crimes listed therein (R. 26; Tl. 22-24, 63-
1. 70-79, 81). .s.e.e_ .aLs..Q Grant of Immunity document (R. 57) • 
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Near the end of the list of crimes was a "blanket 
immunity" provision, i.e., a provision where the blanks had not 
been filled in with the specifics of any particular crime (T. Si: 
Tl. 78). This provision allowed the State to grant Sanchez 
immunity for other unspecified crimes in which he was involved, 
should he later confess and testify to them (Tl. 78, 81). The 
Winn robbery was not specifically listed in the document; nor 
there a clause therein which required Sanchez to implicate 
appellant or Mr. Fernandez (appellant's co-defendant) in any 
crime as a condition of him receiving immunity (Tl. 82-83; T3. 
58) • Grant of Immunity document CR. 57) • 
Pursuant to this immunity grant, and to a subsequent 
promise by the prosecutor that the Winn robbery would fall under 
the blanket provision, Sanchez confessed to and issued a sworn 
statemept regarding the participation of appellant, Mr. 
Fernandez, Mr. Mitchell, and himself in the Winn robbery (Tl. 22· 
23, 63-64, 78-79, 81). Sworn Statement of November 4, 
1981 (R. 57). 
Based upon Sanchez's statement, appellant and the 
others implicated by Sanchez were subsequently arrested and 
charged with the aggravated robbery and theft of Mr. Winn and hi: 
property (R. 5, 46-49). 
Mitchell, one of those implicated by Sanchez, test if iE; 
at appellant's trial that after his arrest, he had contacted 
Detective Labrum of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office 
the possibility of working out a deal in return for informatior 
on two robberies in which he had been involved--one of which 
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c1e Winn robbery (Tl. 132-135). ..s.e.e_ .<U.s..o. Letter to Prosecutor 
· ,c"1 Sheriff's Office, dated December 6, 1982 (R. 57). No 
was reached as a result of this discussion (T. 135). 
'i .wever, on the evening before trial, Mitchell entered into a 
rlea agreement with the prosecutor, wherein he pled guilty to 
rr,lJbery in the two robberies in which he had been involved in 
return for a dismissal of the charges of theft and possession of 
a firearm by a restricted person (Tl. 97-100, 103, 106, 116, 123, 
129-130, 142). Mitchell was required under the agreement to 
testify "fully and truthfully" regarding his knowledge of the 
robbery (Tl. 141-142). 
At trial, both Sanchez and Mitchell named appellant as 
an accomplice in the Winn robbery. Both testified to having 
known appellant at least a couple of months prior to the night of 
the robbery (Tl. 25, 101). Mitchell had met appellant through 
Fernandez (appellant's co-defendant), with whom Mitchell had been 
acquainted for several years (Tl. 101-102). 
Sanchez's and Mitchell's testimony corroborated much of 
."r. Winn's account of the events of the evening in question. 
Mitchell testified that appellant and Fernandez had arrived at 
Mitchell's apartment on the evening of January 1, 1981, around 
'o:OO p.m. (Tl. 106-107, 124, 138). The three men discussed the 
1lea of "making money," i.e., committing some robberies (Tl. 
JC8i. After grabbing some nylon stockings which Mitchell kept at 
1.s apartment (Tl. 110, 114, 124), they all left in appellant's 
1 1e and brown Lincoln Continental to pick up Sanchez (Tl• 108-
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109) .1 Appellant was driving the vehicle (Tl. 108-109). 
They picked up Sanchez at his cousin's home around 7:oo 
or 7:30 p.m. (Tl. 29, 65). Sanchez brought a dark-colored .38 
caliber revolver that he kept at Carrillo's (his cousin's> house 
(Tl. 29-30, 66-67, 109, 139) • 2 Both Mitchell and Sanchez 
testified that around 8:30 or 9:00 p.m., Fernandez--who lived 
near Mr. Winn's residence--reIT.arked that he "knew of this retired 
colonel that supposedly had a lot of money, maybe some gold or 
something" (Tl. 34, 52, 112). Fernandez gave directions, and 
appellant drove the men to Mr. Winn's residence (Tl. 34-35, 51, 
112). Sanchez testified that they saw "the colonel" outside of 
his car, but inside his garage, as they passed by his home (Tl. 
35, 53-54) • 3 Appellant drove about 50 or 100 feet beyond the 
house, stopped on a bridge, and let Mitchell and Fernandez out of 
1 Sanchez, was staying at a halfway house during that period, but 
had received a pass on January 1, 1981, allowing him to leave the 
facility to go to his cousin, Richard (Dickie} Carrillo's home 
for the evening (Tl, 21, 26-27). 
Sanchez testified that he had been planning on meeting with 
appellant that night "to go out and make some money," i.e., to 
"[p]ull some robberies" (Tl. 28). According to Sanchez, 
appellant had recruited him in this venture <Tl. 64, 82-84). 
Sanchez noted that he had not intended to actually "do the 
robbery"; he was merely going along to provide the gun and to 
keep company with the others involved (Tl. 56, 64, 84). 
2 Sanchez admitted that he furnished the weapon used in the Winn 
robbery--the only weapon that he recalled being used that night 
(Tl. 45, 68). Mitchell verified that only one gun was used in 
the robbery (Tl. 115, 126). 
3 Mitchell testified that Mr. Winn had not yet arrived at home 
when he and Fernandez got out of appellant's car and approached 
the house (Tl. 125, 139-140). His recollection was that he and 
Fernandez had reached the porch and were about to knock on the 
front door when Mr. Winn pulled into the garage (Tl. 112-113, 
125, 140). 
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the car (Tl· 35-36, 54). One of them, according to Sanchez, was 
cArrying Sanchez's gun (Tl. 35). Both were carrying nylon masks 
I' 35, 53, 55, 110). 
After Mitchell and Fernandez departed, appellant and 
Sanchez proceeded westbound in the car, made a U-turn, and then 
started back toward the colonel's house (Tl. 36). As appellant 
and Sanchez were approaching the bridge on their return trip, 
they saw Mitchell and Fernandez running westbound toward them 
1Tl. 36, 681. Sanchez testified that Mitchell and Fernandez 
rep:irted that the colonel had resisted the robbery and that, as 
he could recall, the robbery was unsuccessful (Tl. 37-38, 68-69). 
Recounting the events of the robbery, Mitchell 
testified that he and Fernandez, both wearing nylon masks, 
entered the garage and confronted Mr. Winn (Tl. 112-114). They 
wrestled him to the ground, took his wallet from his back pocket, 
and left the garage (Tl. 113, 1261. They then ran back to the 
car appellant was driving and reported that the colonel had "put 
up a little fight" (Tl. 1411. The gun was returned to Sanchez 
(Tl. 115); and the wallet was opened, revealing some cash and a 
check (Tl. 114). The men then allegedly talked about the 
contents of the wallet and split up the cash among the four of 
them (Tl. 114, 126-1271. Mitchell testified that he tore up the 
check and threw it out the window (Tl. 114, 127-128). The wallet 
was also thrown out the window (Tl. 126). 
Sanchez recalled telling the others that he had to be 
hork at the halfway house by 11:00 p.m. and that they should 
"''rn0diately return him to his cousin's house--which they did (Tl· 
-7-
37-381. This recollection was verified by Mitchell's testimon; 
(Tl. 141). 
Appellant testified at trial in his own defense. lk 
admitted his acquaintance with Sanchez, Fernandez, and Mitchell 
(T2. 187-189, 206, 209-211, 213-2151. He indicated that he had 
interacted socially with Sanchez and Fernandez on a number of 
occasions CT2. 187-1891. Even though he did not consider Sanchez 
to be a good friend, he did admit to having sponsored Sanchez or. 
one occasion while the latter was in the halfway house (T2. 1891. 
Appellant said that he did consider Fernandez fo be his friend 
(T2. 187-1881. In fact, according to his and his step-mother's 
(Mrs. Smith's) testimonies, appellant and Fernandez were indeed 
together on the evening in question (T2. 154, 156-159, 163, 170-
171, 201, 203-205, 216-2171. Finally, appellant admitted to 
ownin<; and having in his possession, on the night in question, a 
car fitting the description rendered by the State's witnesses 
CT2. 162-163, 190, 211, 217-2181. 
Despite these admissions, appellant denied any 
participation in the Winn robbery CT2. 207, 211-213, 2151. He 
and his step-mother testified that he was at home with his fami' 
and Fernandez on the evening of January 1, 1981 (T2. 158-159, 
170-171, 203-205, 216-2171. However, much of this testimony 
dealt with where appellant was the night btlQil and during the 
earlier part of the day of the robbery (T2. 151-153, 162-163, 
170, 172-173, 177-178, 182-184, 191-203). 
During the remainder of New Year's Day and evening--
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rding to Mrs. Smith, 4--the family, Fernandez, and appellant 
--1 a;ed at home watching television (T2. 157, 165). However, she 
,:d not remember what programs or football games, if any, they 
o0t,_-hed (T2. 165) • 5 
Appellant also claimed that they "sat around" and 
'dtched television (T2. 204-205), and that neither he nor 
left the apartment that night IT2. 205). Mrs. Smith 
:estified that she did not recall seeing either of them leave the 
2?artment that evening (T2. 159). 
There is a question as to how late Mrs. Smith stayed up 
that evening and whether she would have seen them leave the 
apartment that night had they done so. She said that she went to 
:;ed about midnight (T2. 166), but later conceded that she had 
admitted four days earlier, in the county attorney's office, that 
she did not know when she had retired to bed on that particular 
P'fening (T2. 166-16 9). 
Judge Baldwin instructed the jury on the law pertinent 
to the case (R. 144-182). Notably, the defense did not ask for a 
4 In an apparent effort to portray Mrs. Smith as an unbiased, 
disinterested witness--despite her relationship with appellant as 
his step-mother--appellant and Mrs. Smith testified that they 
were not very fond of each other and that they did not consider 
:hemselves to be friends IT2. 150, 161, 178, 192-193, 208-209). 
- She recalled Fernandez leaving for a time during the afternoon 
IT2. 157-158), but did not recall appellant leaving with him IT2. 
: 5 7J • 
hf'f'el lant testified that he and Fernandez left the apartment 
about 4:00 or 5:00 p.m, that he took Fernandez home so 
he rould change his clothes, and that they then returned to 
-,,- apartment to eat dinner and watch a college football game on 
'Pl,vis1on (T2. 203-204). He could not remember what game they 
,--,e horn<' to watch IT2. 204). 
-9-
men could not possibly reach verdict beyond reasonable doubt). 
For it is the exclusive function of the trier of fact to 
determine the defendant's guilt or innocence, the credibility "f 
witnesses, and the weight to give conflicting evidence. .sta.t._e 
v. Linden, Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1983); State v. Mccardell, 
Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945; State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216, 
218 (1976). And it is who, on appeal, bears the 
burden of establishing that the evidence was so inconclusive or 
insubstantial. State y. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 
(1980). Appellant has failed to meet this burden. 
It must be noted at the outset that neither the mere 
failure of a victim to identify his assailants nor the absence 
of physical evidence at the scene of the crimes which links a 
defendant to those crimes is sufficient to render improper a 
jury verdict based upon other adequate direct or circumstantial 
evidence. The central issue in this case is whether the 
evidence presented by the State was sufficient to 
establish each of the elements of the offenses charged and thus 
sustain the jury's verdict. 
Appellant was convicted as an accomplice, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1978), in the aggravated robbery 
of Mr. Winn and the theft of the contents of his wallet. 
Section 76-2-202 provides: 
Every person, acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense who 
directly commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage 
in conduct which constitutes an offense shall 
be criminally liable as a party for such 
conduct. 
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To convict appellant as an accomplice to the 
robbery of Mr. Winn, the jury had to find (1) that 
.1ppe 11 ant solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or 
aided another person or persons to engage in the 
robbery; (2) that appellant did so intentionally or knowingly; 
cind (3) that a deadly weapon, firearm, or facsimile of a firearm 
1-as used in the commission of the crime. Utah Code Ann. 
3§ 76-2-202, 76-6-302 <1978). Se..e jury instructions nos. 13, 
27, 28 (R. 155, 169-171). A robbery, as used above, is 
committed when (a) personal property is taken from another 
oerson, (b) that property is in the possession or the immediate 
presence of such other person at the time it is taken, (c) the 
property is taken contrary to the will of such other person, (d) 
the taking is accomplished by means of force or fear, (el the 
taking is unlawful, and (f) the taking is intentional. Utah 
Code Ann.§§ 76-6-301(1) (1978). Se..e jury instructions nos. 17-
18 (R. 159-160). 
To convict appellant as an accomplice to the theft of 
::r. Winn's property, the jury had to find (1) that appellant 
sc•l i cited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally 
0ided another person to obtain or exercise unauthorized control 
·"er the property of Mr. Winn; ( 2) that he did so intentionally, 
1,""'inqly, or recklessly; (3) that the property did belong to 
\vinn; (4) that appellant had the purpose at that time to 
'"I" ive the owner of said property; ( 5) either that the value of 
I µroperty exceeded $1,000 or that one of the actors in the 
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Furthermore, Mrs. Smith indicated that she was unsure 
of the time when she retired to bed that evening (T2. 166-1691. 
After having stayed up until 1:30 or 2:30 a.m. the night before 
(T2. 177-178), she may well have gotten tired early in the 
evening on January 1. Under such circumstances, the jury coulG 
have reasonably inferred that Mrs. Smith retired to bed early 
that evening and was not awake when appellant left the 
apartment. 
Finally, Mrs. Smith testified that appellant was 
present in the apartment when dinner was served, which alleged!)' 
occurred between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. <T2. 158, 165). Even if 
Mrs. Smith were telling the truth, the jury could have 
reasonably believed that dinner was served around 5:00 p.m. and 
that appellant left the apartment sometime after dinner, 
arriving at Mitchell's apartment around 6:00 p.m., as testified 
to by Mitchell (Tl. 106-107, 124, 138). 
Appellant asserts, however, that there was evidence l'. 
show that he was at home when the robbery was taking place. He 
then cites State y. John, Utah, 586 P.2d 410 (1978), for the 
proposition that where there is any reasonable view of the 
credible evidence which is reconcilable with appellant's 
innocence, a reasonable doubt exists as to his guilt (emphasis 
added). But, in that same case, this Court also stated: 
[Wle emphasize that this does not mean just 
any view of any of the evidence, however 
unsubstantial or incredible, which a party to 
such a controversy may dream up. 
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Utah, 586 P.2d 410, 412 (1978). And again, in 
Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 232 Cl980), this court held 
ncr 'J1e "evidence relied upon by the jury need not refute 
.nL1d'Y allegations made by the defendant, as long as the jury 
e1dict is supported by substantial evidence," which it is in 
thi_s case. 
Furthermore, the jury was not required to even believe 
df'pellant or his step-mother: 
The jury were not obligated to accept as true 
defendant's own version of the evidence nor 
his self-exculpating statements as to his 
intentions and his conduct. They were 
entitled to use their own judgment as to what 
evidence they would believe and to draw any 
reasonable inferences therefrom. 
State y. Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761, 762 (1979). Having 
evaluated the defense witnesses' demeanor and candor on the 
stand, having been aware of the witnesses' potential motives to 
fabricate their testimonies (i.e., their family relationship and 
ctppellant's desire to stay out of prison), and having observed 
firs Smith's faulty recollection of the events which transpired 
on the day in question, the jury did not act unreasonably in 
disregarding or giving less weight to the testimony rendered by 
't1ose witnesses in making its determination. That being the 
case, there was substantial evidence to support the verdicts of 
to the counts of aggravated robbery and theft. 
Appellant also claims that the testimonies of two 
accomplices were inherently unbelievable and were not 
'Oborated by other evidence at trial. 
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The trustworthiness of or the weight to be given their 
testimony is clearly a matter for the jury. The fact that they 
had received some benefit from the State in return for their 
testimony is also but a factor which the jury could weigh in 
assessing credibility and did not make the witnesses' testimony 
unreliable. Moreover, neither the grant of immunity nor 
the plea bargain agreement necessarily gave these witnesses a 
"motive to lie"--especially given the fact that both agreements 
were conditioned upon them testifying fully and truthfully. (R. 
26, 57; Tl. 22-24, 63-64, 70-79, 81, 141-142) .'6 Certainly the 
State's witnesses had no greater "motive to lie" than did 
appellant and his step-mother. 7 Appellant claims Sanchez's 
criminal record indicates a "motive to lie". If this were so, 
certainly we could have a stand-off in this case since the 
record establishes that appellant too had a criminal record. 
Thus, the criminal records of all witnesses were useful for 
impeachment purposes on both sides, and the weight to be 
accorded the respective testimony is best left to the trier of 
fact. 
6 Nor was there any apparent "motive to lie" based upon animosity 
between them and appellant. Appellant admitted that he knew botr 
of the witnesses (T2. 187-189, 206, 209-211, 213-215), that he 
had interacted socially with at least Sanchez (T2. 189), and that 
he had in fact sponsored Sanchez on one occasion when the latter 
was in the halfway house (T2. 189). He made no indication that 
he was on "bad terms" with either of the witnesses. 
7 Despite to appellant's assertion that he and his step-mother 
were not on the best of terms, Mrs. Smith had not only known 
appellant about ten years when she testified she (11 
was married to appellant's father and (2) was 11v1ng in the samE 
apartment as appellant in January of 1981 (T2. 161, 193) • 
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In any event, this Court has held that a possible 
""'' lvP to lie on the part of a witness--even though that witness 
rnav have previously been involved in similar criminal activity--
noes not necessarily render his testimony so suspect as to leave 
a reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt. In State y. 
lillsQn, Utah, 565 P.2d 66 (1977), the appellant there argued 
that the testimony of an undercover agent who purchased a 
balloon of heroin in a controlled buy was inherently unreliable 
because she was a former heroin user and she therefore had a 
motive to lie. Since the agent's testimony was considered 
indispensable to the appellant's conviction, the appellant 
argued that there must necessarily have been a reasonable doubt 
as to his guilt. Rejecting this reasoning, this Court observed: 
The judging of the credibility of the 
witnesses and the weight of the evidence is 
exclusively the prerogative of the jury. 
Consequently we are obliged to assume that 
the jury believed those aspects of the 
evidence, and drew those inferences that 
reasonably could be drawn therefrom, in the 
light favorable to the verdict. 
State v. Wilson, Utah, 565 P.2d 66, 68 <1977). .5.e..e State v • 
.EatQn, Utah, 569 P.2d 1114, 1116-1117 (1977). 
The jury in this case determined that the testimony 
rendered by Sanchez and Mitchell was credible. Therefore, 
unless appellant can show that the evidence was so lacking that 
"reasonable men could not possibly have reached a verdict beyond 
'' reasonable doubt,• State v. Logan, Utah, 563 P.2d 811, 813-
Rl4, <1977), the validity of the witnesses' testimonies and 
appellant's resulting conviction should be upheld. 
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Finally, the testimony of Sanchez and Mitchell was, 
indeed, corroborated by other evidence at trial. First, their 
own testimonies were highly corroborative of one another. With 
a few exceptions, they gave similar accounts of the events 
surrounding the robbery. 8 .se..e. State y. Utah, --P.2d--, 
No. 19284, slip op. at 2 (April 26, 1984); State v. Watts, Utah, 
675 P.2d 566, 568 <1983) (contradictory evidence at trial is not 
sufficient to disturb jury verdict). 
Second, appellant completely overlooks the testimony 
given by the victim, Mr. Winn, which was largely· corroborative 
of the testimonies of Sanchez and Mitchell--the only exception 
being the n..wn.b.e.1:_ of guns carried by Mr. Winn's assailants. That 
Mr. Winn could not make a positive identification of appellant 
is understandable, granted that appellant was allegedly driving 
the getaway car at the time of the robbery. 
Appellant also ignores the corroborative value of some 
of his own admissions at trial. .se..e_ State y. Romero, Utah, 554 
P.2d 216, 219 (1976); State y. Mattiyi, 39 Utah 334, 117 P. 31 
<1911) (defendant who takes the stand cannot escape the 
consequences of any fact testified to by him). Appellant 
admitted that he was acquainted with Sanchez, Mitchell, and 
Fernandez (T2. 187-189, 206, 209-211, 213-215). Furthermore, hE 
8 Their testimonies differed in only three minor respects: Ii' 
whether or not a stop was made at another residence before 
one was made at the Winn residence, ( 2) whether or not the 
colonel was at home when the men first arrived at his residence, 
and (3) some of what occurred in the appellant's car following 
the robbery (Tl. 30-33, 35, 37-38, 53-54, 65, 68-70, 112-114, 
125-128, 139-140). 
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admitted that he was with Fernandez on the evening of the 
tolibery (T2. 154, 156-159, 163, 170-171, 201, 203-205, 216-217). 
He also admitted that he owned and had in his possession, in 
January of 1981, a car matching the description rendered by the 
state's witnesses (Tl. 26, 30, 108-109; T2. 162-163, 190, 211, 
217-2181. Certainly it was more than coincidental that Sanchez 
and Mitchell--particularly when the latter was not well-
acquainted with appellant (T2. 209, 214-215)--would each know 
that appellant and Fernandez were together and had access to a 
blue and brown Lincoln on the evening of January 1, 1981. 
There was other evidence, then, to corroborate the 
testimonies of each of State's challenged witnesses. However, 
such corroboration was not necessary. As noted by this Court in 
197 8: 
It has long been held in this state that 
the credibility of the witnesses is for the 
trier of fact; and there is no rule governing 
how many witnesses are needed or that the 
testimony be corroborated by other evidence 
before the trier of fact can decide how to 
determine the weight of the testimony. 
* * * 
As to the quality of the testimony given, it 
is settled that it must be so improbable that 
it is completely unbelievable before it is 
insufficient to uphold a conviction. 
y. Middelstadt, Utah, 579 P.2d 908, 910, 911 (1978). 
Since 1979, these rules of law have also applied to the 
testimony of an accomplice. ..s.e.e_ State y. Ber<J, Utah, 613 P.2d 
·us n.2 ( 1980). An "accomplice," such as Sanchez and Mitchell 
'" the present case, is "one who participates in a crime in such 
0 '''Y that he could be charged and tried for the same offense." 
y, Cornish, Utah, 560 P.2d 1134, 1136 (1977), and cases 
' 1·2J therein; Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1978) • 
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Utah law provides that "[al conviction may be had on 
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-17-7(1) (1982). It further provides: 
In the discretion of the court, an 
instruction to the jury may be given to the 
effect that such uncorroborated testimony 
should be viewed with caution, and such an 
instruction shall be given if the trial judge 
finds the testimoriy of the accomplice to be 
self contradictory, uncertain or improbable. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-7(2) Cl982l. In this case, such a 
cautionary instruction was given. jury no. 13 
(R. 155). The jury was also instructed to take into account the 
bias, motive, or interest in result of each of the witnesses, as 
well as their deportment, frankness, and candor • ..5.e..e. jury 
instruction no. 8 CR. 150). 
Nevertheless, as the exclusive trier of fact, the jury 
chose to believe the testimony of at least one of the 
accomplices. Viewing the evidence in the light favorable to the 
jury verdict, State y, Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761, 762 (1979), 
that determination and appellant's resulting conviction should 
be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS JUSTIFIED IN CORRECTING 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S IMPROPER REMARKS; 
FURTHERMORE, APPELLANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE 
JUDGE'S COMMENT WAS PREJUDICIAL, NOR HAS HE 
PROPERLY PRESERVED THE ISSUE FOR APPELLATE 
REVIEW. 
Appellant complains of a comment made by the trial judge dunri0 
defense counsel's closing argument. Counsel had been assertin 
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, 1,.·1t the State had failed to meet its burden of proof because it 
1,J,I not called two other individuals as witnesses who were known 
ic have participated in a robbery with Sanchez on one occasion 
in the past. Counsel suggested that the "missing witnesses" 
rr,iyht have been the real accomplices in the Winn robbery and not 
appellant (T3. 35-36). Judge Baldwin stopped counsel, stating 
that those "witnesses" were not necessary to the disposition of 
this case, that the State was therefore not required to bring 
them into court to testify, that the jury should disregard 
counsel's comments suggesting that the State did bear such a 
burden of proof, and that the defense had just as much of a 
right as did the State to call those witnesses (T3. 36). 
Appellant claims that this comment violated his 
constitutional right to remain silent; that it impermissibly 
shifted to appellant, in the eyes of the jurors, the burden of 
producing evidence; and that it prevented defense counsel from 
presenting a vital theory of appellant's case to the jury. 
First, inasmuch, as defense counsel's line of argument 
Was improper, the judge was justified in commenting to the jury 
o0 he did. The law is clear that there are occasions when a 
Jcdge, as governor of the trial, must step in and restrain 
cuunsel from making improper remarks to a jury: 
It is the duty of the trial court to correct 
mistakes of law made by counsel in argument 
to the jury, and, on its own motion, to 
interrupt and admonish counsel when he 
exceeds the bounds of legitimate argument. 
'i Jur. 2d, l'.llAl § 117 (1974) (footnotes omitted}. £e.e 75 
''· Jur. 2d, 1'Ii.al § 318 (1974); Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 166, 251-
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253 (1958 & Supp. 1984); State y, Gilbert, 99 N.M. 316, 319, 65i 
P.2d 1165, 1168 (1982) ("The trial court has broad discretion i:. 
controlling argument to the jury. If no abuse of this 
discretion or prejudice to the defendant is evident, error 
not result."}. Judge Baldwin properly stopped appellant's 
closing argument because it misstated the State's legal burden 
of proof. 
Judge Baldwin stated that the State bore no burden in 
producing witnesses not known to have seen or been involved in 
the case at hand CT3. 36) • State y. Mjddel stadt, Utah, 579 
P. 2d 908, 910 (197 8) (there is no rule governing the number of 
witnesses needed before the trier of fact can determine the 
weight of a witness' testimony}. The jury in this case alread1 
had the testimonies of Sanchez and Mitchell. 
Nonetheless, counsel argued to the jury that, inasmuch 
as Carrillo and Johnson had been involved once in a robbery with 
Sanchez, they were likely involved with Sanchez and Mitchell in 
the Winn robbery (T3. 34-37). Therefore, he argued, the State 
should have produced them as witnesses (T3. 36). This reasoning 
is nonsensical. 
Counsel alleged at trial that Sanchez had participated 
in some forty felonies (Tl. 63, 73-74, 80-81); Carrillo and 
Johnson were known accomplices in only one of those alleged 
felonies (Tl. 75-76, 90-94). Assuming that there were 40 
felonies, under defense counsel's reasoning, anyone who may ha1·e 
participated in the other 39 felonies should also have been 
called by the State as witnesses to "clear themselves." Under 
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,11 theury, perhaps all known and possible acquaintances of 
. .rii'hez should have been brought into court. Perhaps Sanchez 
, 0 1.,,,rking with "new blood" on the Winn robbery. Under such 
ieosu,iing, appellant could continually suggest "possible others" 
.rn might have been involved A.d infinitum. 
The State was only required to meet its burden of 
proving the elements of the theft and aggravated robbery charges 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Because this burden was incorrectly 
3 ta ted by the defense to the jury, Judge Baldwin was justified 
intervening and correcting counsel's error. 
In 1979, after citing a similar exchange between the 
trial judge and defense counsel during the latter's closing 
argument, this Court stated: 
Defendant claims that the court's 
comments misstated the law so as to mislead 
the jury [and] that to not permit the defense 
to argue that the state has failed to prove 
an element of the offense is to effectively 
direct a verdict in favor of the state ••• 
* * * 
To have allowed defense counsel's arguments 
to go unchallenged, the jurors would have 
been led to believe that the state had failed 
to prove one of the elements of the crime. 
The court judiciously corrected any confusion 
which may have arisen. 
s. Piepenbur..i, Utah, 602 P.2d 702, 707-708 (1979). 
l,1Kewise, Judge Baldwin judiciously corrected any confusion 
·'htch defense counsel's remarks may have created in the minds of 
·''" J'iiors in this case. His comment, then, was proper. 
However, not only did defense counsel's comments 
the State's legal burden of proof, they suggested the 
-•iety of the "missing witness" inference in a situation 
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where, even under appellant's case law, such an inference could 
not properly be drawn to the jurors' attention. Admittedly, Ute 
"missing witness" inference has been judicially recognized for 
nearly a century • ..5..e.e Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. llS, 
121 (1894). That inference has been summarized as follows: 
[Ilf a party has it peculiarly within his 
powers to produce witnesses whose testimony 
would elucidate the transaction, the fact 
that he does not do it permits an inference 
that the testimony, if produced, would have 
been unfavorable. 
United States y. Young, 463 F.2d 934, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
Recently, however, this inference has undei;;gone greater judicial 
scrutiny and caution in its application, the primary reasons 
being (1) that comment on the inference can easily be 
misleading, (2) that its invocation at the Md of the trial may 
unnecessarily surprise the other party who was unaware that it 
might be invoked, and (3) that the record is often inadequate to 
support its invocation. Comment, "Drawing an Inference from the 
Failure to Produce a Knowledgeable Witness,• 61 Calif. L. Rev. 
1422, 1426, 1428-1429 (1973). 
The D.C. Circuit has determined that "comment by 
counsel • as to absent witnesses is prohibited if either of 
the conditions [for its invocation) is lacking, that the witness 
was peculiarly within the power of the party to produce, and 
that his testimony would elucidate the transaction." 
States y. Young, 463 F.2d 934, 939-940 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit <which earlier had decided the 
case relied upon by appellant) held last year that 
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a party can properly .ru::.s.u.e. to the jury 
the possibility of drawing such an inference 
from the absence of a witness, .llll.l..S..t 
establish that the missing witness was 
peculiarly within the adversary's power to 
produce by showing either that the witness is 
physically available only to the opponent or 
that the witness has the type of relationship 
with the opposing party that pragmatically 
renders his testimony unavailable to the 
opposing party. 
Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine v. George A. Fuller Co., 
i19 F.2d 1335, 1353 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). 
Under this standard, defense counsel was precluded 
from arguing the "missing witness" theory to the jury. The 
record does not show that Carrillo and Johnson were peculiarly 
within the power of the State to produce as witnesses. It did 
not show that they were involved in any way (e.g., as an 
informer) with the development of the State's case. .l.l.D.i.t.e..d 
,lJ;ates v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 926-927 (7th Cir.), • 
.iknie..d, 429 U.S. 1025 (1976); Burgess v. United states, 440 F.2d 
226, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Nor does appellant point to any 
widence in the record to support a claim that their testimonies 
would be noncnmulative or superior to the testimony rendered by 
Sanchez and Mitchell. united States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 
926 l7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 u. s. 1025 (1976); Brown v. 
l!Ltite..d States, 414 F.2d 1165, 1166-1167 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
Appellant argues, however, that Carrillo and Johnson 
were unavailable to the defense in a pragmatic sense, alleging 
"lslince the prupose [sic] of having Carrillo and Johnson 
'''stify would have been to clear the appellant by incriminating 
"mselves, it is not reasonable to believe that either missing 
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witness would have testified for the defense." Even if this 
were the case, defense counsel would have been precluded f rorn 
alluding to the inf er ence since only one of the two r eq ui remenc, 
or conditions of the inference would have been established. 
United States v. 463 F.2d 934, 939-940 (D.C. Cir. 1972), 
Furthermore, appellant has failed to even establish 
this form of unavailability under Utah law, which requires that 
appellant first subpoena the missing witnesses to the witness 
stand and give them a chance to assert their privileges against 
self-incrimination before he may consider them as "unavailable." 
In State y. White, Utah, 671 P.2d 191 119831, this Court--
referring to a missing witness in the case--observed: 
There is no merit to the appellant's 
contention that defense counsel could not 
call Latham to testify because she knew 
Latham would invoke his Fifth Amendment 
privilege. • • Using the exercise of a 
privilege as evidence is readily 
distinguishable from using it to demonstrate 
a declarant's unavailability. The latter, 
far from being prohibited, may be required. 
Without subpoenaing Latham and interviewing 
him •••• , defense counsel had no means of 
establishing whether he would assert his 
privilege or not. 
* * * 
[Aln attorney's knowledge that a witness 
intends to assert his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination does not 
bar calling that witness for the purpose of 
showing his unavailability. 
State v. White, Utah, 671 P.2d 191, 193-194 (19831. 
In this case, appellant's counsel asserts that a 
decision was made to not use Carrillo and Johnson as witnesses. 
Although the above passage may be read as not necessarily 
requiring that the witnesses be called by the complaining part1 
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'" 511ow their unavailability, it does make it clear that 
ought to have been done to show that unavailability. 
i'lir record does not show that anything of this nature was done 
n the present case. Therefore, appellant has failed to satisfy 
first prong of the test, that the witnesses were 
peculiarly within the power of the State to produce. Judge 
Baldwin wisely barred defense counsel from improperly arguing 
the "missing witness" inference to the jury. 
Appellant claims that the judge's comment did severe 
damage to his case at trial. He contends that it prevented him 
from effectively presenting the theory of his case to the jury, 
that it shifted to appellant the burden of producing witnesses, 
and that it infringed upon his constitutional right to remain 
silent. These claims are not borne out by the record. 
Even if there were some support for these claims, 
'ltlhe burden of showing error is on the party who seeks to 
upset the judgment." State y. Jones, Utah, 657 P.2d 1263, 1266-
1267 (1982). The standard which appellant must meet in showing 
such error was recently summarized by this court as follows: 
Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure directs that "!alny error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not 
affect the substantial rights of a party 
shall be disregarded." § 77-35-30. We have 
interpreted this rule to mean that error is 
reversible only if a review of the record 
persuades the court that without the error 
there was "a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for the defendant." ..s..t.a..t..e 
v. Hutchison, Utah, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (1982). 
y, Fontana, Utah, --P.2d--, No. 17796, slip op. at 9 
rch 2, 1984). state y. Urias, Utah, 609 P.2d 1326, 1329 
-29-
(1980); State y. Pierre, Utah, 572 P.2d 1338, 1352 (1977), ilh_'_g 
.d.eni.e.d, State y. Andrews, 576 P.2d 857, cert denied, 439 u.s. 
882 (1978); State y. Eaton, Utah, 569 P.2d 1114, 1117 (1977). 
Appellant has not shown that the alleged error in this case was 
so substantial or prejudicial that there would have been a 
different result in its absence. 
Appellant cites a number of cases to support his 
position that he had a right to present the theory of his case 
to the jury in a clear and understandable way. He then alleges 
that Judge Baldwin erroneously prevented him from exercising 
that right during closing argument. 
Appellant has misstated these cases, all of which deal 
with when and how instructions are to be presented by the 
court. Moreover, they merely stand for the proposition that, 
where there is evidence sufficient to justify a proposed 
instruction on a given issue, the trial court has a duty to 
adequately instruct the jury on that issue. State y. Stone, 
Utah, 629 P.2d 442, 446 (1981); State y. Potter, Utah, 627 P.2d 
75, 78 <1981); State y. Eagle, Utah, 611 P.2d 1211, 1213 (19801: 
State y. Brown, Utah, 607 P.2d 261, 265-266 (1980). 
In this case, the defense had not even submitted an 
instruction to the court pertaining to the "missing witness" 
inference. Assuming that counsel had even thought of the issue 
prior to closing argument, he made a tactical decision to wait 
until .af..t.e...t: the jury had been instructed and the State had 
argued its case to bring up the absence of Carrillo and Johns 00 
Appellant now challenges the judge's comment which, he claims, 
-30-
"revented him from effectively presenting this theory of his 
Certainly, if this had been the theory of his case, he 
have at least asked for an instruction in that regard. 
It is true that Sanchez was asked on cross-examination 
,ihether Carrillo and Johnson were involved in the Winn robbery 
!Tl. 68, 80). But asking those questions and receiving 
Sanchez's negative responses were hardly sufficient to make it 
appear "obvious from the testimony" that the "missing witness" 
issue comprised .the issue (or even .an issue) of appellant's 
when those questions and responses comprised 
a total of less than one page of the 200-plus pages of testimony 
rendered at trial (Tl. 68, 80). 
In sum, Judge Baldwin prevented appellant from using 
the surprise tactic of introducing a new issue at the end of the 
trial. 
Appellant also argues that the judge's conunent shifted 
the burden of production to him, making it appear to the jury 
that he had a _du.t,;c to call witnesses. It is undisputed that the 
State bears the burden of proving appellant guilty and that 
oopellant has no _du.t,;c to call witnesses that might exculpate 
himself. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-501, 77-1-6(2) (c) (1978); .s..t.a...t..e. 
;, Starks, Utah, 627 P.2d 88, 92 <1981); State v. Housekeeper, 
'-'tah, 588 P.2d 139, 140 (1978). However, it is also clear that 
tl1c Judge's comment did not depict an affirmative .du.t,;c on 
to call Carrillo and Johnson as witnesses. 
Judge Baldwin stated, in pertinent part: 
I am going to tell the jury you had as much 
_r_i_gh.t to bring them in as anybody and they 
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were not necessary •••• [Tlhe State had no 
burden as relates to them in this case and 
the defendant had all of the ..r;_i_ght_s of the 
State to bring them in. 
(T3. 36) (emphasis added). Judge Baldwin spoke of rights, not 
duties. He was merely indicating that the defense could have 
called Carrillo and Johnson as witnesses had it believed that 
their testimonies were important or essential to a proper 
disposition of this case. 
Section 77-1-6(2) (cl indicates that a defendant may 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself, not that he 
has no right to give such evidence. Here, Judge Baldwin was 
merely clarifying the respective rights and duties of the 
parties: the State had no duty to call the two witnesses, and 
the defense was not precluded from doing such had it so desired. 
Certainly, it was not prejudicial error for the judge to make a 
curative or ameliorative statement to the jury in an effort to 
neutralize the improper remarks made by defense counsel in his 
closing argument. 
Finally, appellant claims that as an off shoot of the 
defendant's constitutional right to remain silent, a decision 
was made not to use particular witnesses; and that the court 
erred in commenting on this decision, which comment tended to 
impair his right not to produce witnesses. First, appellant's 
cases are not on point. They address solely the issue of 
prosecutorial comment and judicial instruction regarding a 
defendant's decision to .inYQk_e his constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination and not testify at trial. They say 
nothing of an "offshoot" of that right--a constitutional right 
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t, uQt produce witnesses. Furthermore, appellant does not show 
this comment "clearly tended to impair" that alleged right. 
Assuming that the right does follow from the privilege 
, pinst self-incrimination,9 appellant is estopped from alleging 
error regarding the judge's comment because (1) he waived his 
privilege against self-incrimination when he took the stand and 
testified; and (2) by his counsel's remarks during closing 
arqument about the so-called missing witnesses, he opened 
himself up to either judicial comment or prosecutorial rebuttal. 
The privilege against self-incrimination is 
when a defendant takes the stand and offers his own testimony: 
he then is like any other witness at trial. State v. Green, 
Utah, 578 P.2d 512, 514 (1978): State v. Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 
276, 279, 495 P.2d 804, 806 (1972); State v. Adams, 26 Utah 2d 
377, 380-381, 489 P.2d ll91, 1193 (1971). Speaking of the 
privilege against self-incrimination, this Court observed in 
1964: 
The defense could either claim the privilege 
or waive it, whichever it thought would be to 
9 The Fifth Amendment provides that "[nlo person ••• shall be 
''ompelled in any criminal case .t..Q a witness against himself. 
" u.s. Const. amend v (emphasis added). The broader language 
of the Utah constitutional provision, codified in Utah Code Ann. 
5 77-1-6(2) (cl (1978), perhaps more appropriately encompasses the 
right argued for by appellant (if it does), where it says that an 
"accused shall not be compelled .t..Q _giy_e_ evidence against 
himself." Utah Const. art I, § 12 (emphasis added). Even then, 
0 ppellant does not show that the testimony of the missing 
'<itnesses would have been "against himself:" indeed, he indicates 
should they have testified, they would have allegedly 
<ncrim1nated themselves and exculpated appellant. Appellant has 
llloyically tried to convert a personal choice to not call 
and Johnson as witnesses (persons who allegedly would 
'a•·c his case J into a constitutionally-protected right. 
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its best advantage. But it could not engage 
in halfway measures by waiving the privilege 
and obtaining the benefit of having [the 
defendant] testify and still claim some of 
the protection refusal to testify affords .. 
• • [Ilf the privilege is claimed it should be 
scrupulously protected. But when it is 
waived, it is done away with just as though 
it did not exist 
state y. Brown, 16 Utah 2d 57, 59, 395 P.2d 727, 728-729 <19641. 
In this case, appellant took the stand and offered testimony 
(T2. 186-218). Since he had waived his privilege, he had none 
upon which the trial judge could comment. Therefore, no error 
was committed. 
Furthermore, appellant opened himself up for attack 
when counsel improperly brought up the "missing witness" 
issue at trial. In an analogous situation, this Court has 
determined that comment upon issues, which might otherwise be 
inappropriate, may be proper when the defendant (or his counsel 
opens himself up to attack by his own comments in that regard: 
It is of note that the trial court 
viewed the prosecution's remarks to be 
harmless error, if error at all, as defense 
counsel had opened the subject, and the 
prosecution was clearly entitled to some 
rebuttal • • • • It was unwise and hazardous 
for defense counsel to make comments as he 
did on defendant's failure to testify, as it 
triggered the mechanism or rebuttal by the 
prosecution, and hence, may have invited 
error •••• [Tlhe court was wholly within 
its discretion in ruling as it did. 
State y. Eagle, Utah, 611 P.2d 1211, 1214 (1980). 
In this case, it was the judge, and not the 
prosecution, which made the comment to correct any "invited 
error" made by defense counsel (T3. 36). Nonetheless, the same 
reasoning applies. Judge Baldwin did not take it upon himselt 
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0 mment on appellant's failure to call Carrillo and Johnson 
provocation; the judge was correcting errors made by 
1.irnse counsel when he improperly commented on the State's 
a' !eged failure to call them as witnesses. Having opened up the 
discussion on the issue, and having done so in such a way as 
might confuse the jury, appellant was not substantially 
prejudiced by the judge's curative comment. Hence, no 
constitutional rights were violated. 
Even assuming that error was somehow committed by the 
Judge's comment, appellant has not properly preserved the issue 
for appellate review. In State y. Steggell, Utah, 660 P.2d 252, 
254 (1983), this Court held: 
In the absence of exceptional circumstances, 
this Court has long refused to review matters 
raised for the first time on appeal where no 
timely and proper objection was made in the 
trial court. 
Id. (defendant had failed to make any objection to the court's 
comments at the time they were made or during the course of the 
trial, and then raised the issue for the first time on appeal). 
ill Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-12(dl (1982); State v. John, Utah, 
667 P.2d 32, 33 (1983); Jaramillo y. Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 21, 
465 P.2d 343, 344 (1970); State y. Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d 
174, 406 P.2d 912, 913 (1965). And in State y. Malmrose, Utah, 
G49 P.2d 56, 58 (1982), this Court stated that where no 
001ection is made at trial, assignments of error are only to be 
to the extent that they bear upon an ineffective 
c:isrance of counsel claim. Appellant claims no exceptional 
'' ·-· 11 o·st ances in his brief to warrant appellate consideration of 
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an issue that was waived through the lack of a timely objection 
at trial. Neither does appellant's issue relate to an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Appellant should not 
now be able to claim prejudice with respect to the court's 
comment. 
Furthermore, defense counsel never objected to the 
judge's comment during the trial. Appellant did file a motion 
for a new trial based upon the comment; however, the motion was 
filed five days after appellant had been sentenced, and over a 
month after he had been convicted (R. 185-186, 201-202, 205-206, 
209-211). That motion was subsequently argued and denied (R. 
219). Under this Court's ruling in State y. Hales, Utah, 652 
P.2d 1290 (1982), this motion came too late to cure appellant's 
untimely objection to the judge's comment. In that case, this 
Court observed: 
In State y. Zimmerman, 78 Utah at 130, 1 P.2d 
at 964, this Court held that a defendant's 
objection to a remark made by a judge to the 
jury before completion of their deliberation 
"must be made before verdict, otherwise it 
may not be reviewed on appeal." This 
principle applies here • • • • In the 
instant case, defendant's failure to lodge a 
timely objection that would have allowed the 
court to mitigate any damage done by the 
prosecutor's comments precludes our review of 
the alleged error. 
State y. Hales, Utah, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (1982) (emphasis in 
original). Likewise, appellant should be precluded from raisi'. 
on appeal the trial judge's comment in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
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I ower 
For the foregoing reasons, appellant's convictions for 
und aggravated robbery should be affirmed, as should the 
court's denial of appellant's motion for a new trial. 
--r/ 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 'j___ day Of October, 1984. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
--? . 
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